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Abstract
Background: Different strategies for addressing the challenge of prioritizing elective patients efficiently and fairly 
have been introduced in Norway. In the time period studied, there were three possible outcomes for elective patients 
that had been through the process of priority setting: (i) high priority with assigned individual maximum waiting 
time; (ii) low priority without a maximum waiting time; and (iii) refusal (not in need for specialized services). We 
study variation in priority status and waiting time of the first two groups across different medical disciplines.
Methods: Data was extracted from the Norwegian Patient Register (NPR) and contains information on elective 
referrals to 41 hospitals in the Western Norway Regional Health Authority in 2010. The hospital practice across 
different specialties was measured by patient priority status and waiting times. The distributions of assigned 
maximum waiting times and the actual ones were analyzed using standard Kernel density estimation. The 
perspective of the planning process was studied by measuring the time interval between the actual start of healthcare 
and the maximum waiting time.
Results: Considerable variation was found across medical specialties concerning proportion of priority patients 
and their maximum waiting times. The degree of differentiation in terms of maximum waiting times also varied by 
medical discipline. We found that the actual waiting time was very close to the assigned maximum waiting time. 
Furthermore, there was no clear correspondence between the actual waiting time for patients and their priority 
status.
Conclusion: Variations across medical disciplines are often interpreted as differences in clinical judgment and 
capacity. Alternatively they primarily reflect differences in patient characteristics, patient case-mix, as well 
as capacity. One hypothesis for further research is that the introduction of maximum waiting times may have 
contributed to push the actual waiting time towards the maximum. The finding that the actual waiting time was 
very close to the maximum waiting time supports this. The lack of clear correspondence between the actual waiting 
time for patients and their priority status may imply that urgency, described in the referral letter, and severity of 
illness, according to guidelines, are two separate entities. 
Keywords:  Waiting Lists, Prioritization, Healthcare Sector
Copyright: © 2016 by Kerman University of Medical Sciences
Citation: Gangstøe JJ, Heggestad T, Norheim OF. Norwegian priority setting in practice – an analysis of waiting 
time patterns across medical disciplines. Int J Health Policy Manag. 2016;5(6):373–378. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2016.23
*Correspondence to:
Ole Frithjof Norheim 
Email: ole.norheim@uib.no 
Article History:
Received: 30 June 2015
Accepted: 22 February 2016
ePublished: 2 March 2016
Original Article
Full list of authors’ affiliations is available at the end of the article.
http://ijhpm.com
Int J Health Policy Manag 2016, 5(6), 373–378 doi 10.15171/ijhpm.2016.23
Implications for policy makers
• This study found that most of the patients received healthcare within maximum waiting times, but many patients received treatment just before 
this assigned maximum time. Policy-makers may consider ways to change the management of waiting lists. 
• Low-priority patient groups sometimes wait shorter than high-priority groups.  This could be explained by variation in capacity and differences 
in clinical judgments. This calls for revision of the guidance documents and better harmonization across medical disciplines.  
Implications for the public
This study looked at how patients’ right to healthcare services and maximum waiting times have been translated into practice in Norway. We found 
that a large majority of the patients received healthcare within maximum waiting times, but that there are variations between types of services. Such 
variations are to be expected because diseases, and patients, are different and their severity of illness varies. However, some of these differences in 
access to care may be unacceptable and could be explained by variation in capacity and differences in clinic judgments. These types of variations 
should be reduced.  
Key Messages 
Introduction
Fair allocation of healthcare services is a general aim, but 
also a great challenge for all healthcare systems. Universal 
healthcare systems typically provide access to high quality 
care and financial risk protection, but are also known for 
generating waiting lists.1 Reducing waiting time for elective 
procedures is a continuous health policy issue in many OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
countries.2 Several mechanisms have been introduced 
including maximum waiting time guarantees (The United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway), often linked to economic incentives (see for 
example3). Other countries introduced additional mechanisms 
of patient choice and increased reliance on private providers. 
Some countries also developed prioritization tools ensuring 
that patients with higher urgency or severity are treated more 
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quickly. Examples of such tools are severity scoring systems 
(New Zealand and Canada), or discipline-specific guidance 
with individual maximum waiting times (Norway). 
The first official report addressing principles for priority 
setting in Norway was developed in 1987 (later revised in 
1997 and 2014).4 The system was differentiated further 
by introducing a set of waiting time guarantees.5 These 
guarantees were replaced by the Patients Rights Act of 
1999.6,7 According to this Act, § 2-1, the patient has a right 
to specialized healthcare if three criteria are met: (1) the 
patient has a condition which affects prognosis related to life 
expectancy or quality of life if healthcare is delayed, (2) the 
patient has expected utility of the healthcare, and (3) there is 
a reasonable relation between the costs and effectiveness of 
the service.
The Patients Rights Act further specifies that each elective 
patient must be considered individually and if assigned a 
right, also given a specific maximum waiting time. From 2004, 
this individual maximum waiting time was combined with a 
new incentive mechanism. If this maximum waiting time is 
exceeded, the patient has a legal right to file a complaint and 
choose treatment at another hospital at the cost of the initial 
health enterprise. This cost is proportional to the expected 
cost of treatment. Complaints are rarely filed. In addition, 
patients have free choice among public providers, and a right 
to appeal on the priority assigned by the hospital. 
Preliminary data from the Norwegian Patient Register (NPR) 
indicated that the assignment of rights and maximum waiting 
times were practiced differently among the health regions.8 
The share of patients qualifying for the right to necessary 
healthcare varied from 48% to 69% in different health regions 
in 2010.9 It was postulated that patients received different 
status and different maximum waiting times depending on 
where they lived and which hospital they were referred to. 
Experience from a pilot study in the Western Health Region 
also indicated different prioritization practices among 
different specialties.10
The issue of waiting lists has been given high political 
attention, and in 2007 the Ministry of Health and Care 
Services, therefore, commissioned the Regional Health 
Authorities and the Norwegian Medical Association to 
develop guidance documents for more than 30 different 
specialties. These guidance documents for how to set priorities 
should be distinguished from clinical practice guidelines 
that are developed through a different process with different 
methods for assessment and appraisal. This guidance was 
meant to standardize prioritization practice in the country 
and to provide advice on which patient groups should be 
assigned a right to specialized healthcare and their maximum 
waiting times.7,11 These guidance documents were developed 
and implemented in 2009.12 Table 1 provides two examples of 
guidance for hip arthrosis and severe to moderate depression. 
Thus the Norwegian priority-setting policy for elective 
specialized services includes (i) The Patient’s Rights Act of 
1999 (revised in 2004 and 2013); (ii) A governmental white 
paper on priority setting; and (iii) National priority-setting 
guidance documents for more than 30 medical disciplines. 
In the time period of interest (year 2010), there were three 
possible outcomes for elective patients that had been through 
the process of priority setting: (i) high priority with assigned 
individual maximum waiting time; (ii) low priority without 
a maximum waiting time; (iii) refusal (not in need for 
specialized services).
Little is so far known about how this guidance affected 
the actual priority setting across different specialties. It is, 
therefore, interesting to examine waiting time patterns for 
elective patients in a period after the introduction of the 
guidance documents. This baseline can then be used to 
evaluate further changes in waiting time regulations that are 
proposed but not yet fully implemented. 
The aim of this article was to study variation in priority 
status and waiting times across different medical disciplines 
for elective patients admitted in 2010 to specialized services 
within one Regional Health Authority in Norway. More 
specifically, we explored three questions: (i) Were the 
prioritization profiles similar for different specialties? (ii) 
When were the services provided, compared to assigned 
maximum waiting time? (iii) What was the relation between 
priority status and actual waiting time? 
Methods
Waiting lists and the priority given to hospital patients can 
be closely monitored by patient administrative data. These 
hospital data are collected locally and transferred to the 
national level into the NPR. To analyze the prioritization 
practice at the hospitals located in the Western Regional 
Health Trust, data was selected from the national register. 
The population in the region is about 1 mill. Our dataset 
contains detailed information on patients with at least one 
planned hospital contact during the year 2010. The number of 
hospitals included was 41 and the total number of remissions 
was 388 112.
We used three different outcome measures to describe how 
the hospitals prioritize patients in practice: (1) the proportion 
of prioritized patients (assigned a legal right to necessary 
healthcare); (2) the assigned individual maximum waiting 
time for prioritized patients; and (3) the actual waiting time 
independent of priority group. 
Waiting time is defined as the interval from the referral is 
received at the hospital until access to healthcare. However, 
this does not always mean start of treatment since physicians 
might need additional information to fully assess the referral 
and before treatment can be started. The maximum waiting 
time is defined from the same reference point until the date 
of the individually assigned maximum waiting time. We 
excluded some referrals from the analyses according to the 
operationalization used in official waiting list statistics (like 
cases where a first appointment was postponed by a patient, 
or appointments for follow-up), as well as cases where waiting 
time or assigned maximum waiting time exceed two years 
(this amounts to 2% and 1% of the dataset, respectively). 
To analyze the distributions of actual waiting times and 
assigned maximum waiting times, standard kernel density 
(Epanechnikov) estimation was used. Kernel density estimate 
f(x) where x = x0, is, 
0
0 1
1( ) ( )N ii
x xf x K
Nh h=
−
= Σ

 where h is the 
smoothness parameter and K is the Kernel function that 
assigns more weight to the x-values that are closer to x0.13 The 
calculations for mean, standard deviation (SD), and quartiles 
are also reported. 
When comparing prioritization practices among different 
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hospitals, it may be a challenge to overcome differences in 
organization and structure. However, in our material all 
patient contacts are attributed to a coded medical specialty 
according to the character of the condition and the care 
given. For the more detailed analysis, it was necessary to 
select a subset of groups. We found similar patterns for 
different disease categories. However, the priority profiles 
as measured by the distribution of the guaranteed waiting 
times may roughly classify the specialties into three different 
typologies: two with distinct peaks for respectively short or 
long guaranteed waiting times, and the third with a more 
heterogeneous distribution. Nikolova et al14 also identify 
three sets of disease categories which are based on the 
difference in the magnitude of the effects, and present the 
results for circulatory, digestive system diseases and diseases 
of the nervous system. We selected four different specialties 
fitting the three typologies for further detailed analysis: 
gastroenterology, pulmonary diseases, orthopedic surgery, 
and mental healthcare for adults. The number of referrals for 
patients in these selected specialties was 73 774.
Results
The Proportion of Prioritized Patients in Different Medical 
Specialties 
The share of referrals for patients given legal status as 
prioritized varies greatly by medical discipline as shown 
in Figure 1. For all somatic specialties the proportion of 
prioritized patients varied between 49% and 91%. Among 
the psychiatric specialties and addiction medicine, a very 
high share of patients was assigned a legal right to specialized 
healthcare. Pediatric patients also range among the highest 
prioritized, while patients within ophthalmology, plastic 
surgery and general surgery range among those with the 
lowest priority proportion. 
Prioritization Profiles – Given by Individually Assigned 
Maximum Waiting Times and Actual Waiting Times
For the selected four specialties (orthopedic surgery, 
gastroenterology, pulmonary disease, and psychiatry for 
adults) their practice profiles for prioritized patients are 
given as the distribution of the assigned maximum waiting 
times and the actual waiting times. The results imply distinct 
prioritization patterns as shown in Figure 2 and Table 2. 
With the exception of orthopedic surgery the patterns indicate 
similarities in terms of left-skewed distributions for the 
maximum waiting times. This indicates that many referrals 
are given relatively short waiting times (25th percentile 
amounts to 30-40 days). 
Figure 1. Proportion of Patients With Priority Status by Clinical 
Discipline.
The profile of maximum waiting times for orthopedic surgery 
is clearly different, characterized by a maximum spike at 
around half a year (median is 168 days). The distributions 
of actual waiting times vary, but one can see that they follow 
the profiles for the maximum waiting times relatively closely, 
especially for gastroenterology and pulmonary diseases. For 
orthopedics and mental healthcare, the two curves are clearly 
separate where the actual waiting times generally are reached 
well ahead of the maximum waiting times. The dispersion as 
measured by the standard deviation, are quite similar for the 
two waiting time measures, except for pulmonary diseases 
where it is higher for the actual waiting times than the 
maximum ones.
Planning Profiles: The Difference Between Actual Individual 
and Assigned Maximum Waiting Times 
To visualize the planning process of the hospitals, the time 
interval between the maximum waiting time and the actual 
end of waiting time at the level of individual patients, were 
analyzed. A negative interval implies that care has started 
before the assigned maximum waiting time, while a positive 
Table 1. Examples From Guidance Document for Orthopedic Surgery and Adult Mental Healthcare
Condition Interventions Grading According to Priority Criteria Guidance
Hip arthrosis 
- Moderate and severe
- Drug Therapy
- Physiotherapy
- Insertion of total prosthesis
The condition/care is considered to: 
- Have high severity 
- Be beneficial 
- Be cost-effective
- Should be assigned a right to 
necessary care 
- Significant ailments: Within 12 
weeks 
- Moderate ailments: Within 26 weeks
Depression 
- Severe to moderate 
(MADRS score >20)
- Investigation
- Cognitive therapy 
- Psychoeducation
- Treatment with SSRI or other antidepressants
The condition/care is considered to: 
- Have high severity  
- Be beneficial 
- Be cost-effective
- Should be assigned a right to 
necessary care 
- Within 6 weeks
Abbreviations: MADRS, Montgomery–Asberg Depression Rating Scale; SSRI, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors.
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one implies that the maximum limit is violated. As Figure 
3 shows, violations occur within all specialties. A common 
feature is that for a majority of cases, the given healthcare starts 
just before the maximum waiting time. And furthermore, 
most of the patients with violations of maximum waiting 
times receive care shortly after the assigned maximum limit. 
Apart from these common features, the profiles vary. 
Gastrointestinal conditions had the most prominent central 
tendency where on average the patients received care 7 days 
before the maximum waiting time, while mental health had a 
higher share of patients where care started (around a month) 
prior to the maximum waiting time. Orthopedics had the 
most extracted profile where the patients on average received 
care two months prior to the maximum time. 
Priority Status Measured Alternatively According to Short or 
Long Actual Waiting Times 
Waiting time may be considered an important indicator for 
real prioritization status. It is, therefore, interesting to analyze 
the actual waiting times independent of whether the referral 
was a given a legal right to priority or not. We define short 
waiting time as less than 30 days and long waiting time as 
more than 180 days. Within the selected specialties, 21% of 
the patients with short waiting time did not have a legal right 
to necessary healthcare as described above. For the ones with 
long waiting times, 57% of the patients were prioritized. This 
indicates that the degree of urgency and waiting time does not 
directly reflect priority group or the degree of severity. Within 
the selected specialties, psychiatry had the highest share of 
patients with short waiting times, while orthopedic surgery 
had the highest share of patients with long waiting times. 
Discussion
In this study, we find considerable variation across clinical 
disciplines in the proportion of priority patients and in their 
assigned individual maximum waiting times. The specialties 
analyzed have different characteristics and patient case-
mix, which are obviously reflected in the prioritization 
practice. Furthermore, some specialties apply only minor 
differentiation (most patients are assigned the same maximum 
waiting times, eg, orthopedics), while others differentiate 
more (eg, mental healthcare). The crucial point is, however, 
how to interpret these findings. In Norway, where the goals 
have been to reduce waiting time and improve fairness and 
equity in access, much attention has been given to variations. 
But very little attention is given to the question of how much 
variation one may expect between different specialties. As no 
adjustments for differences in patient severity or case-mix are 
applied to the results, our opinion is that quite large variation 
is to be expected. The national standardization processes have 
so far focused on standardization within specialties and not 
on harmonization between different specialties. 
Comparisons across specialties must also take into account 
the heterogeneity in the extent of non-planned admissions. 
It is well-known that the composition of emergency versus 
elective patients varies considerably across disciplines. 
Different threshold for access to specialized healthcare is also 
important when interpreting results across specialties. Our 
assessment is based on the patients who actually received 
care at a hospital. A high proportion of priority patients may 
indicate that the threshold to get specialized healthcare is 
also high for these specialties. Such differences in strategies 
or capacity may cancel out the differences in observed actual 
waiting time; for example to give access to less severely ill 
patients compensated by longer maximum waiting times. 
Differences in capacity may be associated with variation in 
funding,15 or the prestige of different medical disciplines,16,17 
but our study was not designed to explore if this was the case. 
Figure 2. Maximum Assigned Waiting Time and Actual Waiting Time 
for Prioritized Patients in Four Clinical Specialties. 
Figure 3. Interval Between Maximum Waiting Time and Actual End 
of Waiting Time for Prioritized Patients in Four Clinical Specialties 
(Distribution of Individual Patients, 2010).
Table 2. Maximum and Actual Waiting Times for Four Medical Disciplines
 Maximum Waiting Times in Days Actual Waiting Times in Days
 25 perca 50 perc 75 perc Mean SD 25 perc 50 perc 75 perc Mean SD  N
Orthopedic surgery 99 168 188 153 70 44 83 139 101 77 15.844
Gastroenterology 31 51 92 75 71 22 42 86 67 72 7.907
Pulmonary disease 40 90 106 84 55 28 69 121 92 88 4.750
Psychiatry (adults) 37 64 92 75 53 19 36 66 51 55 4.969
a Percentiles.
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The Norwegian prioritization guidance documents also allow 
discretion when it comes to each single patient. Based on our 
dataset it is not possible to evaluate whether the individual 
considerations and specific assessments of severity of disease, 
expected benefits and cost-effectiveness, were implemented 
equally across the specialties. Gaming the system is also 
possible when there is room for individual discretion. 
Importantly, most of the patients received healthcare within 
maximum waiting times. However, we find that there are many 
patients receiving treatment just before the maximum waiting 
time. Similarly, for a large share of patients where maximum 
waiting time is violated, the treatment starts just after the 
assigned maximum waiting time. This interesting pattern 
indicates that the planning process itself may be a major 
determinant for the actual waiting time. More specifically one 
may hypothesize that focusing so strongly on the maximum 
time has led to a shift in attention and consequently un-
intentionally may lead to a general lengthening of waiting 
times. As the dispersion of the maximum times and the 
actual waiting times are quite similar, this may support our 
hypothesis. It was also supported by a pilot study from our 
hospital where an alternative model applying a “first come – 
first serve” policy by simulation, resulted in generally shorter 
actual waiting times for the patient population. An alternative 
hypothesis may be that an adjustment of maximum waiting 
times towards the real capacity has occurred. However, in 
the national guiding documents, if followed, the maximum 
times were set according to medical criteria only. Another 
hypothesis could be the effect of incentives. However, the 
incentives in 2010 were quite weak (this was changed in 2015): 
there were no punishments to the hospital management and it 
was up to the patient to complain if waiting time exceeded the 
guaranteed maximum waiting time. 
Another finding is the lack of correspondence between being 
assigned to the priority group and the actual waiting time. The 
fact that 21% of the patients with shortest waiting times did 
not belong to the priority group, and furthermore that 57% 
of the patients with the longest waiting times were assigned 
such a legal right, implies that actual waiting times do not 
directly reflect the relative priority given to each individual 
patient. An interpretation of this finding is that judgments of 
degree of urgency should be distinguished from judgments of 
degree of severity. Another explanation for this finding could 
be that urgency as captured by maximum waiting times is not 
the only factor that impact real waiting times. Drawing on the 
literature on demand and system capacity factors, there are 
reasons to hypothesize that capacity is not well-aligned with 
intended priorities (see for example2,15). 
Waiting lists and prioritizations have received considerable 
political attention in Norway. Different policies have been 
implemented, both financial and judicial. In an international 
perspective, one can find different systems and policies 
introduced. However, a review of various prioritization 
schemes and maximum waiting time guarantees shows that 
the policies introduced are most effective if they are linked 
with economic sanctions.2,18 A comparative study that 
analyzed the introduced maximum waiting time targets in 
Norway and Scotland showed that the policy introduced in 
Norway in 2004, somewhat surprisingly, actually had greater 
impact on the patient groups with lowest priority, and that the 
gain was achieved at the expense of the patients with higher 
priority.19 Other studies – both Norwegian and international 
– have also found significant variations in waiting times and 
prioritization among different hospitals and specialties.19-21 
These indicate that it is difficult to develop priority-setting 
mechanisms that are precise and at the same time general 
enough. 
Other countries have introduced more formalized scoring 
systems for setting priorities between elective patients. One 
study from Canada found that the scores were most similar 
for surgical conditions, while there was least consensus for 
mental healthcare conditions.22 A Norwegian study of how 
health professionals would rank patients with mental health 
problems according to severity of the conditions, showed little 
inter-individual agreement.23
Our study introduces a new dimension by comparing the 
actual waiting times to the individually allocated maximum 
times. However, the results have to be interpreted with 
caution. There are well-known uncertainties about the 
quality of the register data, particularly related to differences 
in registration practices for setting the end-point of waiting 
time. According to the national regulation and guidance 
documents, waiting time end date must be either when the 
specialist starts investigation of the patient (if the condition 
is unclear) or when treatment is started. In practice, the end 
of waiting time is typically registered by the first contact at 
the hospital, regardless of whether investigation or treatment 
has actually started. This practice is also commented on 
in an external review.24 In addition, practices concerning 
registration of patients who are transferred from one hospital 
to another also vary. 
Conclusion
Variations in prioritization practice were found across 
different medical specialties, both in the proportion of 
patients given priority status and the individually assigned 
maximum waiting times. We conclude that variations are to 
be expected, due to differences in patient case-mix and their 
severity of illness. Different thresholds in access to care may 
also contribute to the observed patterns. 
One hypothesis for further research is that the introduction 
of maximum waiting times may have contributed to push the 
actual waiting time towards the maximum assigned waiting 
time. The finding that the start of healthcare generally was 
placed very close to the maximum waiting times supports this. 
Furthermore, there was no clear correspondence between the 
actual waiting times for patients and their priority status, 
which may imply that urgency and severity of illness are two 
separate entities. 
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